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ABSTRACT
The objective of this article is to analyse the relationship pattern of cash flow-investment
among low and high debt firms. To investigate the issue, we employed Hansen’s (1999)
threshold method of non-dynamic panel data. In this article, the firm debt ratio was used as
threshold variable. A balanced panel data of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia,
comprising of 234 companies for a period from 2004 to 2010, was utilized in this study. The
results showed that debt ratio has a significant role at explaining the cash flow-investment
relationship among firms. In particular, the results showed that low debt firms exhibit
significant support to the financial constraints hypothesis, while high debt firms demonstrate
support to the free-cash flow hypothesis. This finding explains why the cash flow-investment
relationship of certain firms is negative, while other firms are positive. It also signifies the
inability of constrained firms to access to external financing; thus, leading the firms to
significantly rely on their internal financings.
Keywords: Investment; cash flow; non-dynamic panel; threshold regression
ABSTRAK
Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis sama ada hubungan aliran tunai-pelaburan
mempunyai bentuk yang sama bagi firma yang keberhutangan tinggi dan yang
keberhutangan rendah. Untuk mengkaji isu ini, kami menggunakan kaedah nilai ufuk Hansen
(1999) bagi data panel tidak dinamik. Dalam artikel ini, nisbah hutang firma digunakan
sebagai pembolehubah nilai ufuk. Dengan menggunakan sampel data panel berimbang yang
terdiri daripada 234 syarikat tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia bagi tahun 2004 hingga 2010,
keputusan kajian menunjukkan bahawa nisbah hutang memain peranan penting dalam
menerangkan hubungan aliran tunai-pelaburan dalam firma. Keputusan menunjukkan
bahawa firma keberhutangan rendah menetapi hipotesis kekangan kewangan, manakala
firma keberhutangan tinggi menetapi hipotesis aliran tunai bebas. Dapatan ini menjelaskan
mengapa ada syarikat mempunyai hubungan aliran tunai-pelaburan yang negatif, sedangkan
yang lainnya mempunyai hubungan positif. Ini menunjukkan bahawa kesukaran firma untuk
memperoleh akses kepada sumber pembiayaan luar akan menyebabkan firma terpaksa
bergantung kepada sumber pembiayaan dalaman mereka.
Kata kunci: Pelaburan; aliran tunai; panel tidak dinamik; penganggaran nilai ufuk
GA
LL
EY
 PR
OO
F
Jurnal Pengurusan 45 (2015) 18 pages, Galley Proof
ISSN 0127-2713 Scopus, Cabell and MyCite Indexes
2
INTRODUCTION
Under Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theorem of perfect capital market1, firm value is
irrelevant to financial structure. Thus, it is argued that firm investment is also irrelevant to its
financing. This irrelevance has been the main assumption to the neo-classical investment
theory of Jorgenson (1963). The theory argues that firms will acquire new capital so that the
marginal cost of capital equals to the marginal product of capital. Therefore, some factors
such as interest rates, taxation and technology that affect the cost of capital are considered in
the theory. This theory holds under the frictionless world, in which sources of financing are
perfect substitutes, and all market agents are well-acquainted with market information. In
contrast, the real world is imperfect. Financial products are differentiated and imperfectly
substitutable. In addition, some agents are bestowed with market information, while others
are struggling to obtain it. In this case, Lin and Chang (2011) argued that Modigliani and
Miller’s perfect market assumptions are not only contradictory to ground operation but the
assumptions also contradict theoretical intuitions. As such, the main causes of these
imperfections are studied by economists, in which the blame is put on information
asymmetries and agency problem as causes to the demolishment of classical ideas. In this
regard, Oliner and Rudebusch (1992), Kadapakkam et al. (1998) and Koo and Maeng (2005)
argue that information asymmetries, agency cost and transaction cost are three major sources
of capital market imperfection. Furthermore, Bhaduri (2005) argued that the magnitude of
imperfection varies in parallel with the information asymmetries and agency problem.
Over the last two decades2, many studies had taken the imperfect market’s conditions
into account. Since then, the role of financial factors in firms’ investment decision has never
been neglected. Many variables have been tested to examine the relationship between finance
and investment, but the most explainable variable to this relationship is cash flow (Carpenter
et al. 1998; Degryse & Jong 2006). However, previous literature exhibited two contradictory
findings regarding to the direction of cash flow-investment relationship. The first finding
discovered a significant positive relationship as shown in Fazzari et al. (1988). On the other
hand, the second finding showed a significant negative relationship.
Vogt (1994) extensively explained the relationship between cash flow and investment.
The positive relationship is based on the pecking-order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf
(1984). The hypothesis is also known as the financial constraints hypothesis. This hypothesis
states that the least costly source of financing is always preferred. The preference arises due
to information asymmetric problem among firms’ insiders and outsiders. The insiders are
always in better position in knowing about their firms’ values. Therefore, in order to avoid
financing bad lemons, the outsiders impose credit rationing on the financing of firm
investment. Contemporaneously, the outsiders may also demand for a premium or ask for a
reduced price when they give out loans to firms, or purchase firms’ equities. Consequently,
firms with low accessibility to financing sources have to forgo some profitable investments to
save their internal funds. Alternatively, firms have to retain their current earnings to finance
those prospective profitable investments. Overall, this relationship indicates positive
correlation between investment and internal fund; whereby in order to increase investment,
the firms need to retain more cash.
In contrast, there are two causes to negative relationship. First, the negative relationship
can be seen when distressed firms with operating losses invest more in the current year than
the previous year. Even though these losses reduce internal funds, firms are still able to invest
because they receive financings from other sources including equity claimants (Bhagat et al.
2005). Second, if we exclude the distressed firms from the estimation sample, the negative
relationship can still occur as explained by the free-cash flow hypothesis. The hypothesis is
developed based on agency problem; whereby the management of the company and its
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shareholders pursue their own interests. Originally, the management acts in a way to
maximise shareholders’ value, but under low monitoring system, managers tend to increase
their benefits at the cost of shareholders. They will overinvest the cash in less-profit making
activities.
The first study that examines the cash flow-investment relationship is carried out by
Fazzari et al. (1988). In the study, they segmented the sample of US listed companies into
three subsamples according to dividend pay-out ratios. The results showed that cash flow is
significant and has positive sign. The magnitude of cash flow coefficient for low-dividend
companies is the highest among the three groups. This implies that low-dividend companies
heavily rely upon internal funds to finance their investments; rationalising why they are
paying less dividends. This finding supports the first hypothesis mentioned above.
Since then, many researchers have attempted to reassess and replicate the study. They
produced mixed results. Cleary (2006) used similar classification as in Fazzari et al. (1988);
however, the study found contradictory results, i.e. high-payout companies are more sensitive
to internal funds than small and low-payout companies. Using different classifications,
Kadapakkan et al. (1998) classified the sample of firms into three categories of firm size: firm
value, total assets and sales. They studied six member countries from the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and found that investment sensitivity is
high among large firms and low among small firms. Bhaduri (2002) found that the financial
liberalization that took place in India benefits middle-sized firms, but small firms have higher
investment sensitivity after the liberalization. The same scenario happened in Ecuador. Using
a sample of 420 Ecuadorean manufacturing companies for a period of 1983-1988, Jaramillo
et al. (1996) found that large and matured firms did not encounter cash flow sensitivity3,
whereas small firms continued to be sensitive. Agung (2000) who tested Indonesian samples
also found a similar pattern of sensitivity. Similarly, Ismail et al. (2010a) also found that
Malaysian firms are unable to have easy access to external forms of financing for investment
purpose. Using size split, Ismail et al. (2010b) found that large firms are not sensitive to cash
flow availability, but small firms are significantly sensitive to the availability of cash flow.
The studies mentioned above used a priori classification to assume possible relationships
among different groups of firms. Normally, the researchers used theoretical explanations and
rhetorical intuitions in explaining the relationships. They argued that small (Jaramillo et al.
1996; Kim 1999; Schiantarelli & Sembenelli 2000; Ismail et al. 2010b), new (Carpenter &
Rondi 2001), private (Colombo & Stanca 2006) and independent (Schiantarelli & Sembenelli
2000) firms are financially constrained because these firms are new entrants to the market;
they have no close relationship with banks or an impressive balance sheet history. As a result,
those firms have less access to external financing.
On the basis of the above argument, previous researchers split the sample into different
groups according to their priori classifications. Fazzari et al. (1988) used cross tabulations
between retention practices and other characteristics of firm such as firm size and access to
external funds to determine a suitable classification. Finally, they managed to classify firms
into three subsamples: high, medium and low pay-out firms. The cross tabulation method is
also used by Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (1997). They plotted liquidity measures against firm’s
capital intensity to determine a plausible cut-off point in order to classify firms according to
capital intensity. Basu and Guariglia (2002) used coverage ratios distribution such that firms
with coverage ratios that are in the upper two-thirds of the distribution of these variables for
at least 10 years will be classified as financially unconstrained firms, and vice versa.
Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) used a cut-off point of 250 employees to divide firms into
size categories: small and large. Median criterion was employed by Ismail et al. (2010b) as
the cut-off point to categorize firms into small and large firms. They used firm value as firm
size’s measure.
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In this regard, Kadapakkam et al. (1998) and Koo and Maeng (2005) argued that the
priori classifications must take into account the exogeneity of the variable used for the
classifications. Otherwise, the estimations will produce inconsistent results. Nevertheless,
many earlier studies had failed to take into consideration the exogeneity variable as the
variable split. Consequently, the results were unable to explicitly justify the truth behind the
cash flow-investment relationship. Moreover, the sample splitting method used as mentioned
above has some drawbacks. The method does not take into account the possible dynamic
change of firms; whereby some firms may change in terms of size, ownership structure and
affiliation to business groups, in which splitting method considers only static classification.
Also, the variance of subsequent subsamples under the splitting method may considerably
differ. Thus, comparing the sample’s results will produce flawed conclusion.
Therefore, taking into consideration the exogeneity condition problem and dynamics of
firm, this study aims to analyse whether cash flow and investment have similar pattern of
relationship between low and high debt regimes. The debt ratio was used to classify firm
behaviour because Whited (1992) argued that firms cannot influence their debt limits. This is
because debt limit indicates the credit-worthiness of the firms, i.e. indicating their ability to
repay. In this study, the debt ratio is measured by the total of firm debt divided by its total
assets. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that there are two
problems that arise from debt, namely moral hazard and adverse selection. The moral hazard
happens when high debt firms tend to invest in risky projects with higher expected returns to
shareholders. On the other hand, adverse selection occurs when outside investors receive
wrong signal; which is, high debt firms are truly good firms, but most of them are lemons.
Therefore, it is crucial to empirically investigate the behaviour of high debt firms and low
debt firms with respect to the investment financing using internal funds, i.e. cash flows.
This article’s aim was to analyse firm behaviour in Malaysia; i.e. how firm investment
behaviour describes the fluctuation in aggregate investment in Malaysia. While studies such
as Ismail et al. (2010a) used full sample approach to investigate the cash flow and investment
relationship and Ismail et al. (2010b) used exogenous sample split to analyse the relationship,
this study employed the threshold regression proposed by Hansen (1999). This method is able
to analyse the relationship between cash flow and investment among different firm groups.
These groups are formed endogenously rather than exogenously as in previous studies. The
groups are not classified based on discrete values, but individual observations; whereby they
are divided into groups based on a specified threshold variable. A bootstrap method is used to
examine the significance of the threshold level. The method will be discussed in the next
section. If the relationship between cash flow and investment is different among groups, this
suggests that there is a threshold as a split between the groups. As a result, the slow economic
recovery after the Asian financial crisis is clearly explained.
This study is crucial because it can provide a better explanation of firm investment
behaviour. The relationship will uncover the ability of firms to strategize their future
investments’ planning in order to maximize their values. Furthermore, if they are sensitive to
cash flow, they may be considered as risky investments. This will hinder the firm’s potential
for growth. Eventually, the investors will rate the firm badly and sell off the shares, thus
affecting the overall market value of the firm.
On the other hand, the information of different behaviours is important for policy makers
at ascertaining the appropriate policy measures for market intervention in order to release the
financial constraints faced by firms. Firms that are suffering from financial constraints will
not able to grow and invest beyond their existing capacities. At the same time, if the firms
experience losses, they will not be able to quickly recover because the losses will restraint the
availability of internal fund and reduce their access to external fund. Consequently, the
aggregate investment drops as the desired investment decreases; and so does the national
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output. Therefore, the policy makers’ intervention is needed in reducing the impact of
financial constraints in order to avoid such consequence.
In doing so, we chose a sample of listed companies from Bursa Malaysia. In this article,
the Q model was used. The model requires the market value of shares to measure the Q; as
such, it cannot be applied to non-listed companies (Ismail et al. 2010a). This study found that
the threshold variable of debt is significant; suggesting different behaviours of firms.
This article is organized as follows: The next section discusses the methodology of
threshold regression, followed by discussion on data sources and estimation results. In the
last section, we conclude this article with a summary and recommendations.
METHODOLOGY
This study employed Hansen’s (1999) threshold regression method of non-dynamic panel
data. However, before constructing the regression model, first and foremost, the unit root
tests were run to test for stationarity.
UNIT ROOT
Baltagi (2008) argued that to totally rely on standard pooled estimators including the ordinary
least squares and fixed-effects without considering the estimated parameters that are
heterogeneous across panels, and the regressors that are serially correlated, may potentially
produce large bias. Also, spurious regression is a problem in panel data. The problems can be
detected with the use of panel unit root tests. Even though testing for unit roots in panel is a
new practice (Baltagi 2008), econometricians have provided several techniques. Lin and
Chang (2011) argued that the application of Hansen’s method requires the variables in data to
be free from unit roots in preventing the spurious regression problem. Therefore, in this
article, we adopted the tests of Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) (2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS)
(2003) and Harris and Tzavalis (HT) (1999) for the testing of unit roots.
THRESHOLD MODEL
Next, a threshold model is developed as to examine the cash flow-investment relationship.
Here, a representative firm is assumed to maximize its net present value of streams of future
dividends., = max +
which is subjected to constraints,= Π , − , −= 1 − +
where, and are the beginning of period capital stock; is the technological shock;
is the net investment; is the expectation operator; is the discount factor; Π is the
profit function; is the adjustment cost of capital; is the depreciation rate. The subscripts
and represent current time period and its increment, respectively.
The cost of capital is assumed to be convex (Hayashi 1982)4 and takes the form of
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, = 2 −
where, is a functional parameter; is the constant to adjust towards . Using the first
order maximization with respect to investment, and setting = , a non-dynamic
type of Q model5 is obtained as follows:= + + + + (1)
The model includes panel subscript of firm6 identifiers. In equation (1), both and
are additive terms and not technically derived from above equations. The term is the
cash flow-capital ratio, while is the firm total debt to total assets. The former is to
represent internal funds. The latter is to denote firm debt effect. Equation (1) also consists of
time-invariant unobserved firm fixed effects, .
To construct a threshold model, the model (1) is modified according to Hansen (1999).
The model becomes= + ′ ≤ + ′ > + + (2)
where, is a threshold variable; ∙ is the indicator function; is the vector of other
exploratory variables; is the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) errors. The
selection of final model will be discussed later in this article. Equation (2) can be
alternatively rewritten as:
= + ′ + + , ≤+ ′ + + , >
Equation (2) or its alternative denotes that the observations are divided into two groups
or regimes. The first regime is where ≤ , while the second regime is where > .
Both ′ and ′ represent regression coefficients of the two regimes, respectively. In this
article, we used debt-asset ratio as the threshold variable to analyse the cash flow-investment
relationship. The variable is exogenous in nature; as discussed in Introduction. It is also a
time-variant. The model implies that high debt firms and low debt firms have different slopes
of cash flow-investment relationship. Being low indebted firms is a result of having less
accessibility to external financing as well as the factors such as, the ability of firms to repay
the debt and the presence default risk.
ESTIMATION
Using = ′ , ′ ′ , = , ′ ′ and = for simplicity, Equation (2) can be
rewritten as:
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= + ′ + (3)
where, = ≤ , > , . Then, Equation (3) is averaged over
time, , so that= + ′ + (4)
where,= 1⁄= 1⁄ ∑
= 1⁄ = 1⁄ ( ≤ )1⁄ >
Subtracting (3) from (4) produces∗ = ′ ∗ + ∗ (5)
where, ∗ = − , ∗ = − and ∗ = − . Meanwhile, − = 0 , because
the average of it, is itself. Therefore, the operation wipes out the unobserved time-invariant
firm fixed effects. The stacked data and errors for each individual taking the forms as
follows:
∗ = ∗⋮∗ , ∗ = ∗⋮∗ and ∗ = ∗⋮∗
where, one time period is deleted, we can rewrite the model (Equation (5)) in vector form so
that it becomes∗ = ∗ + ∗ (6)
where, ∗ = ∗⋮∗ , ∗ = ∗⋮∗ and ∗ = ∗⋮∗ . Finally, Equation (6) is estimated using the
ordinary least squares (OLS). The OLS produces for any value of= ∗ ′ ∗ ∗ ′ ∗ (7)
And∗ = ∗ − ∗ . (8)
The residual sum of squares is
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= ∗ ′ ∗= ∗′ ∗ − ∗′ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ′ ∗= ∗′ − ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗ ∗ ′ ∗ (9)
Nevertheless, is unknown. Therefore, Hansen (1999)7 recommended to be obtained from
the least squares by minimizing , such that= argmin (10)
To obtain that minimises errors, it involves trial and error operations. At any value of
selected, there will be distinct values8 of . In that case, Hansen (1999) suggested
these following steps. The sample observations are sorted according to the threshold variable.
A certain percentage of top and bottom observations is then eliminated. The remaining values
of threshold variable is used to identify . The purpose of the elimination is to reduce the
number of least squares estimations so that the estimations that needed to be carried out are
lesser than . Hansen (1999) also recommended a shortcut which also produces almost
identical results that further reduces the number of least squares. Based on this shortcut, the
search is restricted to certain specific quartiles. Hence, in this study we used a grid that
contains 400 quartiles. Drukker et al. (2005) argued that in the search for , for any
selected, each region must contain certain minimum number of observations. They argued
that it should not lesser than 10 observations.
Once is obtained, Equation (7) and (8) may produce consistent estimates such that =
and unbiased errors, ∗ = ∗ . Meanwhile, the model variance equals= ∗′ ∗ = . (11)
INFERENCE
The threshold obtained in Equation (10) should be tested for its significance. To test for the
significance of the threshold point, the null hypothesisH : ′ = ′
is tested against its alternative. If the null is true, the model should become
= + ′ + +
or after a fixed-effect transformation (Equation (5)),∗ = ′ ∗ + ∗ + ∗ (12)
For the specification comparison purpose, we rewrote (12) into a vector form equation∗ = ′ ∗ + ∗ (13)
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where ∗ = ∗ , = ′ , ′ ′ and ∗ = , . Equation (13) was also estimated
using the least squares. The estimator produces slope coefficient of , residuals ∗ and= ∗ ′ ∗ . These results were tested against the alternative results of (7) to (9) using= − ⁄ . (14)
Hansen (1999) argued that the asymptotic distribution of is non-standard and strictly
dominates the distribution with unknown parameters because it depends on sample
moments properties; and therefore, its critical values cannot be tabulated. Hence, Hansen
(1996) suggested the use of bootstrap procedures to obtain asymptotic p-value. In this article,
we used 300 bootstrap replications to obtain p-value.
Once is known, we need to know whether the threshold is consistent for the true .
This can be done by forming confidence intervals for (Hansen 1999). The hypothesis is to
accept the null such that H : = true using the likelihood ratio statistics= − ⁄ . (15)
As number of observations becomes larger ( → ∞), → , where is a random
variable. Maximizing Equation (15) with regard that is obtained by minimising ,
Hansen (1999) proved that the probability distribution function of is≤ = 1 − − 2⁄ (16)
and its inverse is= − 2log 1 − √1 − (17)
where is the significance level. If the null holds, the statistics fall into the no-rejection
region such that ≤ . If this inequality holds, the inference of = can be
proceeded straightaway (Hansen 1999).
SOURCE OF DATA
A sample of listed companies from Bursa Malaysia was selected to examine the cash flow-
investment relationship. The data were obtained from the Datastream. The raw data were
refined as follows. Following Ismail et al. (2010a) and others such as Laeven (2002), Agung
(2000) and Love (2003), we deleted firms with missing values, firms that operate less than
the length of required sample period9, firms that suffer at least three years of negative net
income within the sample period, and firms that are financial firms. Finally, the usable
sample comprised of 234 listed companies from 2004 to 2010. The data were relatively small
as compared to market’s total number of firms as the data were a balanced panel. We deleted
firms with missing data during the period of 2004 to 2010. Table 1 shows the distribution of
data according to business sectors as defined in the Datastream10. Five variables were
observed; namely, investment, capital, Q, cash flow and debt-ratio. The definition of each
variable is shown in Table 2.
TABLE 1. Sample distribution
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Sectors
Number
of firms
Number of
Observations
Percentage
(%)
Energy (5010) 5 35 2.14
Chemicals (5110) 9 63 3.85
Mineral resources (5120) 16 112 6.84
Applied resources (5130) 17 119 7.26
Industrial goods (5210) 14 98 5.98
Industrial services (5220) 27 189 11.54
Industrial conglomerates (5230) 1 7 0.43
Transportations (5240) 10 70 4.27
Automobiles / Auto Parts (5310) 12 84 5.13
Cyclical Consumer Products (5320) 17 119 7.26
Cyclical Consumer Services (5330) 14 98 5.98
Retailers (5340) 7 49 2.99
Food / Beverages (5410) 43 301 18.38
Personal / Household Products / Services (5420) 2 14 0.85
Food / Drug Retailing (5430) 1 7 0.43
Real Estate (5540) 19 133 8.12
Healthcare Services (5610) 4 28 1.71
Biotechnology / Pharmaceuticals (5620) 1 7 0.43
Technology Equipment (5710) 4 28 1.71
Software / IT Services (5720) 3 21 1.28
Telecommunications Services (5810) 1 7 0.43
Utilities (5910) 7 49 2.99
Total 234 1638 100
Note: Number of firms is 234. The definition of sectors is based on Datastream’s classification. The codes in the
parentheses are Datastream’s sector classification.
TABLE 2. Variable definition
Variables Definition
Capital It is the net of fixed asset depreciation at the beginning of period t. The fixed assets include
property, plant and equipment.
Investment It is the ratio of current capital expenditure to capital.
Q It is the beginning of period average Q. It constitutes book value of total debt and market
capitalization divided by firm total assets which all are measured at the beginning of period.
Cash flow It is the beginning of period operating income plus its respective total depreciation.
Depreciation is comprised of total depreciation, amortization and depletion. The Cash flow is
then scaled by capital to construct cash flow ratio.
Debt-ratio It is the ratio of beginning of period total debt to total assets.
Note: The definitions are based on Ismail et al. (2010a).
ESTIMATION RESULTS
The statistical characteristics of the variables are shown in Table 3. On average, firms spend
about 13 per cent out of their total capital stocks every year for investment. The average
value of Q is 1.0743. This value indicates that all firms in the sample are profitable in which
for any investment made, an additional value of 7.43 percent will be created by the firms. On
the average, the cash flow is relatively high, whereas the debt ratio is considerably low. All
variables are not normally distributed, skewed to the right and highly leptokurtic. Besides,
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overall, the variables are integrated at level (Table 4). This indicates that the null hypothesis
of unit roots is rejected as particularly shown by LLC results. As a result, the estimation can
be done at levels straightaway without taking first differences11.
TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics
Investment ratio Q Cash flow ratio Debt-ratio
Mean
Median
Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Dev.
0.1304
0.0965
3.0269
23.5941
0.1260
1.0743
0.8186
3.5713
23.0281
0.8780
0.6091
0.2364
16.4162
304.2187
3.5684
0.2403
0.1869
15.7223
430.9712
0.3499
Num. of
observations
1638 1638 1638 1638
TABLE 4. Unit root tests results
Levin-Lin-Chu test Harris-Tzavalis test Im-Pesaran-Shin test
Investment ratio -34.3280*
(0.0000)
-0.0404*
(0.0000)
-7.1846*
(0.0000)
Q -40.1076*
(0.0000)
0.1651*
(0.0000)
-4.4882*
(0.0000)
Cash flow ratio -34.2789*
(0.0000)
0.7157
(0.9999)
-0.1639
(0.4349)
Debt-ratio -73.3711*
(0.0000)
-0.1118*
(0.0000)
-0.9153
(0.1800)
Note: The statistics for Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test are bias-adjusted. The statistics for Harris-Tzavalis (HT) test
are the point estimates of rho. The LLC and HT tests the null hypotheses of panels that contain unit root against
the alternative of panels that are stationary. Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test statistics are asymptotic standard normal
distribution of . The IPS tests the null hypothesis of panels that contain unit root against the alternative of
some panels that are stationary. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The IPS test requires the observations
to be at least six observations per panel. All tests subtract the mean from the series in order to mitigate the effect
of cross sectional dependence as suggested by Levin et al. (2002).
MODEL SELECTION
Model (2) is modified to include non-linear components whereby reducing possibility of
spurious correlations due to omitted variable bias (Hansen 1999). In deciding the components
that are to be included in the model, this article followed Lindsey and Sheather’s (LS) (2010)
technique of variable selection. Using stepwise backward selection method, the results of the
selected model are as follows:= + + + + + + ∗ + ≤+ > + (18)
Model (18) inserts powers of Q and D, and their interactions. The number of powers is
determined by the LS test. The selection is made based on the goodness of fit criteria which
include the adjusted , Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Akaike’s corrected
information criterion (AICC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and Mallow’s 12.
THRESHOLD ESTIMATES
Following Hansen (1999), Model (18) was estimated using least squares estimation. The
results are summarized in Table 5. The table shows that the threshold is 0.3536. Whited
(1992) found that the mean of debt to total assets ratio was 0.339. The threshold indicates that
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there are two regimes, which are: below, and above the threshold. The first regime consists of
low-debt firms, while the second regime consists of high-debt firms. The likelihood ratio
statistics for the threshold is significant at one per cent significance level, which rejects the
null hypothesis of no threshold model (Model 12). This implies that firms of different
regimes behave differently with respect to investment behaviour. In addition, Model (18) has
lower residual sum of squares (RSS), at 10.7081, as compared to non-threshold model, at
11.4735, in which that lower RSS represents better model specification.
Figure 1 shows the plot of threshold estimates against the likelihood ratio. The figure
shows that the likelihood ratio falls and crosses the dotted line to hit the zero axis, where the
threshold value is 0.3536. Once the likelihood ratio lies beneath the dotted line, the
confidence intervals (0.354, 0.378) can be obtained. The confidence intervals are based on 95
per cent confidence level where the threshold lies within the range of the intervals. The figure
also shows that there is no second major dip. This implies that there is no other threshold
except 0.3536. This certifies that the regimes are only two.
The existence of the regimes confirms that generalization may not be carried out to imply
firm behaviour to invest. Leverage threshold of 0.3536 shows that the behaviours of low-debt
firms and high-debt firms may not be generalized as similar. This finding supports other
firm’s characteristics such as firm size, maturity and ownership types as mentioned in the
literature. In particular, low-debt firms have different characteristics as compared to their
high debt counterparts. Even more, they have different accesses to sources of fund. Thus, this
will affect their investment strategies. On the other hand, the policy makers should consider
this finding in formulating any policy that is directed by them. The details regarding
investment and cash flow relationship for these categories of firms are elaborated in the next
section.
TABLE 5. Threshold estimates
Residual sum of squares (RSS)
Zero threshold model 11.4735
Single threshold model 10.7081
Threshold Estimate 0.3536
Confidence Region 0.3536  0.3778
Trimming Percentage 0.01
LR Test for threshold effect
100.3591
Bootstrap p-value 0.0067
Critical Values 14.9703 (10 per cent)
22.2871 (5 per cent)
48.8938 (1 per cent)
Note: Number of firms and years used in the estimation are 234 and 7 respectively with total observations of
1404 (after trimming process at 0.05 per cent). Number of Bootstrap replications and quantiles are 300 and 400,
respectively. The confidence level is 0.95.
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FIGURE 1. Confidence interval construction in single threshold model
REGRESSION ESTIMATES
Table 6 demonstrates slope estimate for the least squares regression. There are two types of
variables. First, the regime-independent variables, which are: , , , , and∗ . Second, the regime-dependent variable, which is . The results show that Q is
positively correlated with investment. Previous studies such as Kadapakkam et al. (1998),
Koo and Maeng (2005), Ismail et al. (2010a; 2010b) and Aivazian et al. (2005) also reported
similar finding. The finding is in line with Q theory. The positive relationship indicates high
value of Q (represents high profitability of firms); i.e. for every Ringgit spent for investment,
firm value will increase by 2.9 per cent.
The squared Q indicates nonlinear relationship with investment. The result shows an
inverse relationship between the variables. On the other hand, the debt ratio is not significant
except for the squared debt ratio. The sign is negative. This implies that firm debt is
nonlinearly related with investment, in which the indebtedness restricts firms from having
more debts to finance investment. It indicates that too much debt is not good for investment.
Aivazian et al. (2005) found that increase in leverage level reduces investment. High level of
debt increases default risk and overall risk of running a firm.
Using the debt ratio as the threshold variable to examine the effects of different regimes
to investment, this study found that low debt firms are financially constrained, while
statistically, high debt firms are not financially constrained. This finding confirms the first
hypothesis of pecking-order that asymmetric information reduces firm’s ability to access
external financing. As a result, firms retained their earnings to finance future profitable
investments.
On the other hand, the high debt firms are able to gain access to external financing in
order to carry out other investments. Although the coefficient is not significant, the sign is
negative. This negative sign indicates the existence of agency problem among high debt
firms; whereby insiders of the firms tend to invest in projects that provide them with more
benefits but at the expense of outside investors. This finding supports the free-cash flow
hypothesis explained in Vogt (1994). The finding also supports Hackbarth and Mauer (2012)
whereby financially unconstrained firms tend to use senior unsecured debt claims, while
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constrained firms tend to preserve priority for future debt issues using junior secured debt.
Tangible assets possession is important to increase debt capacity (Ameer 2014).
TABLE 6. Regression estimates
Coefficients Standard errors Hetero-corrected standard
errors
Regime-independent
0.0288** 0.0124 0.0113
-0.0021* 0.0016 0.0012
0.0675 0.0395 0.0527
-0.0433* 0.0213 0.0268
0.0036 0.0018 0.0022
0.0101 0.0125 0.0202
Regime-dependent
0.0338*** 0.0036 0.0110
-0.0032 0.0022 0.0024
Note: *, ** and *** denote 10, five and one per cent of significance levels.
In addition, the above result also shows the importance of debt at signalling good
reputation to outsiders; thus, outweighing the negative impact of debt to investment. A debt
ratio that is higher than the threshold level is useful for firms. This allows better access to
external funds by firms. However, if the debt ratio is too high, it will reverse the positive
impact of debt and impede investment as shown by the squared debt ratio. Therefore, it is
very crucial for firm to have an optimal level of capital structure; with leverage higher than
0.3536 of debt to total assets.
The significance of the threshold also indicates different cash flow-investment
relationship among high and low debt firms; thus, showing the importance of firms’
characteristics in analyzing their behaviours in investment decisions. In this article, the
different levels of debt ratio exhibit different tendency of firms, whereby low debt firms are
highly dependent on internal funds, while high debt firms do not significantly depend on
them. In this case, for unconstrained high debt firms, external funds are more favourable and
cheaper, but not for constrained low debt firms. Thus, high-debt firms are able expand their
investments beyond their current capacities through external funds.
CONCLUSION
The financial constraints and firm investment have been widely studied. However, previous
studies did not take into account the issue of dynamic characteristics of firms while deciding
a splitting criterion. This article employs Hansen’s (1999) threshold regression method of
non-dynamic panel data. In this article, the debt ratio is used as the threshold variable to
analyse the importance of debt levels for firms. A sample of balanced panel data of listed
companies from Bursa Malaysia is chosen. The sample is comprised of 234 companies from
2004 to 2010. The results show that debts have significant effects, in which low debt firms
exhibit significant support for the financial constraints hypothesis while the high debt firms
demonstrate support for the free-cash flow hypothesis.
The significance of the threshold level indicates the presence of firm regime and
validates the importance of firm’s debt level. The finding is crucial because it provides both
firms and policy makers more reliable information regarding firm investment and its
relationship with cash flow availability as compared to the traditional method that is based on
sample splits. The results indicate that debt level produces different signals to investors; in
which low debt firms are less accessible to external fund, while high debt firms have better
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access. To ensure that a proper signal is used when firms access the external funds, the firms
have to decide on their capital structures as to signify internal strength and the ability to fulfil
liability obligations. The capital structure should be consisted of debt ratio that is higher than
the threshold, but the leverage level cannot be too high. This is because extreme level of debt
increases default risk. This strategy guarantees future investment planning of the firms.
Similarly, the policy makers may make use of the finding to formulate appropriate
policies to intervene in the market as to ease the financial constraints among the low debt
firms. Using this directed policy approach, the policy makers are able to reduce the cost of
intervention. At the same time, only the affected firms benefit from the policy measures,
while the rest of firms are not worse-off with the policy implementation. According to Agung
(2000), appropriate policy implementation is important as wrong measure may worsen the
financial constraints faced by the firms. For instance in India, the financial liberalization
benefited only middle-sized firms, while small firms suffered more severe financial
constraints (Bhaduri 2005). Karim et al. (2013) found that in Malaysia, financially
constrained firms are more affected by domestic monetary policy shock with respect to their
equity returns.
ENDNOTES
1 Under a perfect capital market, asymmetric information, transaction costs, and agency
problem are assumed absent. Therefore, firms that operate in the perfect capital markets
behave homogenously. They also issue perfectly substitutable equities and bonds.
2 We consider the year of 1988 as the timeline, when Fazzari et al. (1988) published the
first article that studies the financial constraints and their relationships to firm
investment.
3 No cash flow-investment sensitivity implies that Modigliani and Miller’s theorem holds.
4 The adjustment cost increases with an increase in investment.
5 The expectation operator is omitted through rational expectation assumption in which
expected values are replaced by realised values plus an expectational error (Ismail et al.
2010a).
6 For derivational details, please see Ismail et al. (2010a).
7 Hansen produced many articles on threshold regressions. For further details, see his
website at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~bhansen/progs/progs_threshold.html
8 NT is the number firms multiplied by number of time periods.
9 The required period ranges from 2004 to 2010. The sample was not randomly selected.
10 The sample distribution is informative but the analysis did not analyse sectors.
11 With regard to structural break, it does not affect the analysis since the data period is
short and the trend shift will be insignificant. In contrast, the unit root tests employed in
this article consider cross sectional dependence which is a common issue in panel data.
12 The model is selected if the model has the highest adjusted , lowest statistics of AIC,
AICC and BIC, and closest statistic of Mallow’s to one. If the statistics produce
contradictory results, the result of Mallow’s will be preferred. The results may be
reproduced upon request to the author.
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